The Truth Behind Pearl Harbor

By Chie Theresa Fujioka

As opposed to popular belief, the bombing of Pearl Harbor was the result of the careful planning of the international community to force Japan’s declaration of war. The fact that Pearl Harbor, a base of one of the strongest nations of that time, was attacked because Japan had no better choice, is more than obvious, as shown by the words of the people involved. The total lack of warning by Washington to the people of Hawaii, and statements by the President himself, show how much US political leaders welcomed the attack. These all point to the fact that Franklin D. Roosevelt, along with his cabinet and other close advisors, using the wants and needs of Japan and China, trapped Japan into declaring war against America. There is much more to the story than Japan vs. China.

Japan, an almost completely mountainous country, had few raw materials with which to feed its rapidly growing population and supply its expanding industry (Feis 3). Japan looked to expansion in Asia, along with trade, as a solution. The people viewed their position of invasion justified as “mainly dictates of self-preservation,” (Kawakami). China had a weak and corrupt government, and was “regarded as a ‘happy hunting ground’ by concession seekers of [. . .] especially European [. . .] countries” (Kawakami). She was highly disorganized, giving in easily to the West, but very nationalistic (Dupuy 12). Japan, not only wanting China as its own colony, also could not allow the West to settle completely in Asia for reasons of defense. The Japanese feeling according to Kiyoshi Kari Kawakami, in 1919, was that, “[if] a nation [China] proves so wayward in the management of its own affairs as to jeopardize the welfare and safety of its neighbors, it becomes the right and duty of the neighbors to urge upon that nation such measures as will remove the cause of such embarrassment.” The people of Japan viewed their expansion as the equivalent of US actions in the secession of Panama from Columbia, the control of Haiti, and the dealings with Mexico. They felt it unfair that, “[. . .] the United States may remain calm with regard to Mexico, while Japan, enjoying no such advantage, is extremely restive with regard to China,” (Kawakami). The Japanese basically felt the US to be hypocritical since they, in many instances had done exactly what Japan considered itself to be now doing. On the other side of the world, America wanted free trade in China. She needed Japan’s attack to justify entrance into the German wars, which was currently opposed. This was the perfect circumstance to get what she wanted.

After ending a long period of isolation with the beginning of the Meiji rule, Japan realized the necessity of the modernization and industrialization of the country (Dupuy 1). Because of this, she needed a steady supply of materials. To trade with the US (the other big countries were at war) and to expand into China were the two choices made to fulfill that need. The international community was shocked when Japan rapidly modernized her military and weaponry, and then defeated China, a highly populated country, in battle after battle. But a takeover was not what the US nor Russia wanted, and they attempted to stop Japan. After the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese war, America began limiting Japanese resources. Freezing Japan’s assets, barring her passage through the Panama Canal, and then ceasing export of vital oil, steel, and other machinery, the US demanded that Japan annul the Tripartite treaty made between her, Germany, and Italy by removing her troops from China and Indochina (Perloff). But instead of stopping the Japanese, these embargoes only, “intensified Japan’s national desire [. . .] for independence of her steel industry from foreign mills,” (Kawakami). According to Frank Beatty, aide to the US Naval Secretary, this was the intended purpose. “… Prior to December 7 [1941], it was evident even to me … that we were pushing Japan into a corner.… The conditions we imposed upon Japan – to get out of China, for example – were so severe that we knew that nation could not accept. We did not want her to accept them,” (Perloff). By making the demands so impossible, America was forcing Japan into war.

When the opposition drew to its climax, Japan had little choice of what to do. Backed into a corner, she could either remove her troops, and allow Western colonization in China, exposing herself to eventual attack, or she could fight one of the greatest powers of that time, at a great risk of defeat. If she did take it upon herself to assault the US, Germany was obligated by treaty to also declare war. For the US, this was the way to get the public support of war with Germany. Until Pearl, 94% of people were against going to war (Perloff). If Roosevelt had made the first move, and attacked, he would have lost “a great majority of the support he was receiving from the general population,” (The U.S. Entering World War II). Some have even put forth the theory that this was for the promotion of Socialism in Asia. Yet whatever the other reasons, it worked. Stimson, Secretary of War, noted in his diary, “We face the delicate question of the diplomatic fencing to be done so as to be sure Japan is put into the wrong and makes the first bad move – overt move.” After a conference with FDR, Stimson also wrote, “The question was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot,” (Perloff). During the Atlantic Conference held a few months before Japan’s attack, FDR said, “Everything was to be done to force an ‘incident’ to justify hostilities,” (Willey). All they needed was an incident. The 30th of November, Japan radioed this message, “Japan, under the necessity of her self-defense, has reached a position to declare war on the United States of America,” (Willey). On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. Around 180 planes, mistaken for US B-17 bombers, had Oahu “under full attack” by 8 a.m. (Crossland). The force “sank or heavily damaged 18 naval vessels (including eight battleships), destroyed 188 planes, and left over 2,000 dead,” (Perloff). On December 8, “Jonathan Daniels, administrative assistant and press secretary to FDR, said, “The blow was heavier than he [FDR] had hoped it would necessarily be … But the risks paid off, even the loss was worth the price,” (Willey). The US government, expecting Pearl, felt that the destruction of life there was worth whatever ends they were attempting to reach, as if the end justified the means, showing exactly how intentional this was. Although nothing of what Japan did in Asia or Hawaii can be justified by the behavior of the US, the fact still remains that this great loss of life could have been prevented, but wasn’t, simply because of the interests of the US leaders. Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, wrote two months before Pearl, “For a long time I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by way of Japan.” As stated by Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of Production (1944), “Japan was provoked into attacking America at Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty of history to say that America was forced into war,” (Perloff). Roosevelt himself told the public that “In politics, nothing happens by accident. If it happens you can bet it was planned that way,” (Perloff). Pearl Harbor was a pawn of the government, whose bombing was induced to justify the US’ involvement in the Second World War.

Works Cited

Crossland, Zoe. Study Guides – US History: WWII Pearl Harbor. 10 Feb. 2000. <http:// people2.mw.mediaone.net/eallen/umi/k12/PACKS/SOCIALST/PESSAY.HTM>

Dupuy, Trevor Nevitt. Asiatic Land Battles: The Expansion of Japan in Asia, Military history of WWII vol. 8. New York: Franklin Watts Inc., 1963.

Feis, Herbert. The Road to Pearl Harbor, The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1950.

Kawakami, Kiyoshi Kari. “The Japanese Advance in China.” Japan and World Peace. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1919. 26 Jan. 2000. <http://www.shsu.edu /~his_ncp/Kawa2.htm>.

Perloff, James. “Pearl Harbor.” The New American vol. 2 no. 30. 8 Dec. 1986. 10 Feb. 2000. <http://www.thenewamerican.com/departments/feature/070499.htm>.

The U.S. Entering World War II. cyberessays.com. 9 Feb. 2000. <http://cyberessays .com/History/134.htm>

Willey, Mark. Pearl Harbor Mother of All Conspiracies. 9 Feb. 2000. <http://www. geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/pearl.html>. Additional background information supplied by:

Osborne, Sidney. “Japanese Expansion” “A Chino-Japanese Union” The Japanese Peril. New York: MacMillan, 1921. 26 Jan. 2000. <http://www.shsu.edu/ ~his_ncp/Osbor2.html>

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